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I.

INTRODUCTION

Lars Noah provides an important analysis of a thorny
question—does the deactivation of a pacemaker or other
1
implanted cardiac device constitute permissible withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment or impermissible euthanasia? As Noah
observes, other scholars have addressed the legal questions at stake,
but not in the sustained way that he does. His article provides an
impressive consideration of the issue and will provide valuable
guidance to policymakers and scholars.
Why is the issue so difficult? On one hand, cardiac devices are
forms of “artificial” medical treatment like ventilators, dialysis, or
feeding tubes, and the law has clearly established the right to have
any of those other treatments discontinued. On the other hand,
implanted cardiac devices can become integrated into the patient’s
† Samuel R. Rosen Professor of Law and Co-director of the Hall Center for
Law and Health, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. MD, JD,
Harvard University.
1. Noah discusses pacemakers, cardioverter-defibrillators, and left
ventricular assist devices. A pacemaker maintains a normal heartbeat for the
patient; a cardioverter-defibrillator can electrically jolt the patient’s heart back to a
normal heartbeat from a life-threatening, abnormal heartbeat and can also act as a
pacemaker; and a left ventricular assist device is a mechanical pump that helps the
heart pump blood through the body’s circulatory system. Lars Noah, Turn the Beat
Around?: Deactivating Implanted Cardiac-Assist Devices, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV 1229,
1232–35 (2013).
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body in a way that makes them seem like nearly perfect substitutes
for the person’s failed cells. In this view, deactivating a pacemaker
is not so much like removing a ventilator or discontinuing dialysis
as it is like disabling a transplanted heart, which would constitute
2
an act of euthanasia.
As Noah asks us, how do we decide which is the better analogy
for an implanted cardiac device, a ventilator or a transplanted
heart?
II. THE PATIENT’S MEDICAL CONDITION
According to Mohamed Rady and Joseph Verheijde, the
3
answer turns on the patient’s medical condition. If the patient is
dying from a massive stroke or other life-threatening illness, then
deactivation is permissible. The life-threatening illness is the real
cause of the patient’s death. On the other hand, if the patient is
not facing death from another cause, then deactivation would be
4
tantamount to euthanasia. In such a case, the deactivation would
be the real cause of the patient’s death.
But as Noah points out, resting the analysis on the presence, or
not, of a life-threatening illness raises problems for the withdrawal
of other treatments. Patients can refuse a ventilator even if they are
5
not suffering from a terminal illness.
Although Rady and Verheijde draw their line at the wrong
place, their analysis reflects an important moral intuition. People
really do care about a patient’s medical condition when judging the
propriety of an action that will shorten a patient’s life.
Withdrawing a ventilator from a patient dying of cancer seems very
different from withholding a blood transfusion from a young
mother who suffered substantial bleeding during childbirth.
Similarly, deactivating pacemakers in people who are otherwise
healthy seems very different from deactivating implanted
6
defibrillators in patients who are in the final stages of a terminal
illness and do not want to be resuscitated in the event that their
2. Id. at 1229–1230, 1250–52.
3. Mohamed Y. Rady & Joseph L. Verheijde, Letter, When Is Deactivating an
Implanted Cardiac Device Physician-Assisted Death? Appraisal of the Lethal Pathophysiology
and Mode of Death, 14 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1086, 1086–87 (2011).
4. Id.
5. See Noah, supra note 1, at 1253.
6. An implanted cardioverter-defibrillator can electrically jolt the patient’s
heart back to a normal heartbeat from a life-threatening, abnormal heartbeat in
addition to acting as a pacemaker. Id. at 1233–34.
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hearts stop beating.
Indeed, at one time, end-of-life law did condition a patient’s
right to refuse treatment on the patient’s prognosis. Consider, for
example, the landmark decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court
7
in the case of Karen Ann Quinlan. Under the superseded Quinlan
standard, individuals could exercise a right to refuse treatment
once their prognosis became sufficiently dim, but not when their
8
prognosis was reasonably good.
If we followed the Quinlan approach, we would conclude that
some device deactivations would be permissible, while others would
be impermissible. As Rady and Verheijde suggest, we would
consider the patient’s medical condition in assessing the
9
permissibility of a deactivation.
But Quinlan no longer provides the governing legal standard.
Over time, the law has evolved to the principle that people may
refuse care regardless of their medical conditions. One does not
have to be seriously and irreversibly ill to refuse life-sustaining
treatment. All patients have a fundamental right to accept or
10
decline any medical treatment that is offered to them. It may
seem troublesome if an otherwise healthy person requests the
deactivation of a pacemaker, but that is no more troublesome than
someone rejecting a transfusion of blood that could restore the
person to excellent health.
To be sure, we should be worried when the right to refuse
unwanted treatment results in rejections of simple treatments that
can restore health, and physicians should make sure that such
refusals are well grounded in religious beliefs or other persuasive
justifications. In the end, though, legal rules leave the treatment
decision to the patient.
There are important reasons why the law does not draw
distinctions among different refusals of life-sustaining treatment
based on the patient’s medical condition even though the patient’s
prognosis is an important consideration for people. In particular,
7. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
8. Id. at 664.
9. Rady & Verheijde, supra note 3, at 1086. Other scholars have proposed
different standards. For example, Lynn Jansen would consider the device’s
physical location (inside or outside the patient’s body), its duration of use, and its
functional role. Lynn A. Jansen, Hastening Death and the Boundaries of the Self, 20
BIOETHICS 105, 110 (2006); Noah, supra note 1, at 1244.
10. See DAVID ORENTLICHER, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & MARK A. HALL, BIOETHICS
AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 247–51 (2d ed. 2008).
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it would be very problematic for the state to tell some patients that
the quality of their lives is sufficiently dismal that they can choose
death while telling other patients that the quality of their lives is
sufficiently good that they must choose life. These are not the
kinds of judgments that governments should be making for their
citizens. Hence, the law allows all persons the right to refuse
11
treatment.
And as I have argued previously, society is comfortable with a
broad right to refuse treatment because the typical refusal of
treatment is made by, or for, someone who is seriously and
irreversibly ill. The classic court cases involve patients who suffer
from permanent unconsciousness, advanced dementia, or other
debilitating illnesses. For the most part, an unlimited right to
refuse treatment has the practical effect of life-sustaining treatment
12
being withdrawn from patients who have a poor prognosis.
The same would be true for patients who want their cardiac
devices to be deactivated. Although a relatively healthy person
could ask to have a pacemaker turned off, it is far more likely that
seriously ill patients would want to have their pacemakers
13
deactivated.
In sum, a rule permitting all patients—regardless of their
medical conditions—to have their cardiac devices deactivated
would be consistent with the usual rules allowing all patients to
have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn.
While it may not be possible to distinguish among different
kinds of device deactivations based on the patient’s medical
condition, there are alternative bases for identifying some device
deactivations as euthanasia.

11. DAVID ORENTLICHER, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH: MAKING MORAL THEORY
WORK IN MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 65–68 (2001).
12. Id. at 67–68. And some trial courts will order treatment for patients with
a good prognosis, even though their decisions will be overridden later by an
appellate court. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 10, at 251.
13. Of course, there are times when people with good prognoses will
nevertheless refuse life-sustaining treatment, whether the treatments are
ventilators or pacemakers. But most such refusals are based on sincerely held
religious beliefs. In addition, as discussed, society does not want the government
to decide when someone is sick enough to decline treatment.
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III. REPLACING VERSUS SUPPLEMENTING AN ESSENTIAL FUNCTION
The distinction between the permissible removal of a
ventilator and the impermissible removal of a transplanted heart is
helpful in drawing lines between permissible and impermissible
device deactivations.
A ventilator supplements the patient’s
respiratory capacity but does not replace it. Ventilated patients can
draw on both the ventilator and their lungs for oxygen. Thus,
when ventilators are withdrawn, patients can fall back on their own
respiratory capacity. If the remaining capacity is insufficient to
sustain life, then we can attribute the patient’s death to the
patient’s medical condition, rather than to the withdrawal of the
ventilator. A transplanted heart, on the other hand, replaces the
patient’s cardiac capacity. Transplanted patients can draw only on
the new heart for cardiac function. If a transplanted heart were
removed, the patient would not be able to resort to his or her own
cardiac capacity, for that would have been taken away by doctors at
the time of the transplant.
Thus, we might conclude that deactivation of a cardiac device
would constitute euthanasia when two things are true: the device
supplies a cardiac function that is essential to maintaining the
patient’s life, and the surgery to implant the device included steps
that permanently disabled the patient’s own ability to provide the
function. In such cases, the patient could not survive without the
device, just as the heart transplant recipient could not survive
without the new heart. For example, if a pacemaker were
implanted to maintain a normal heartbeat, and the implantation
disabled the functioning of the patient’s heartbeating cells, then
deactivation would look like euthanasia. Similarly, if a left
ventricular assist device were implanted to pump blood from the
patient’s heart to the rest of the body, and the implantation
disabled the patient’s ventricular function, then deactivation of the
device would look like euthanasia. But if the patient’s heart
retained its own capacity to function—at whatever level remained
after the damage from the patient’s illness—then deactivation of
the device would look like a kind of treatment withdrawal.
Under a distinction between supplementing and replacing an
essential bodily function, deactivation of cardiac devices generally
would not constitute euthanasia. Pacemakers supplement the
heart’s own capacity to generate a heartbeat, cardioverterdefibrillators supplement the heart’s ability to maintain a good
rhythm, and left ventricular assist devices supplement the left
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14

ventricle’s ability to pump blood to the aorta. As Noah observes,
15
all of these devices are “cardiac-assist devices.”
Note how this distinction between supplementing and
replacing an essential bodily function comports with a key
justification for the distinction between treatment withdrawal and
euthanasia. Physicians may try to relieve a patient’s suffering by
withdrawing various treatments, even if there is a high risk of death
from the withdrawals. However, physicians cannot try to relieve a
patient’s suffering by fully disabling an essential body function.
Thus, for example, if a physician withdrew a ventilator and also
administered a drug that blocked the patient’s own pulmonary
function, then we would have euthanasia. Death can be anticipated
and even likely, but it cannot be the inevitable result of the
physician’s actions.
Would it always constitute euthanasia to remove a device that
replaced, rather than supplemented, an essential cardiac function?
Would future recipients of a total artificial heart never be able to
have their hearts deactivated? If we were to apply a strict definition
of euthanasia, we would include deactivation of any device that
replaced, rather than supplemented, an essential cardiac function.
But we might want to take a less restrictive approach. We
might want to look more deeply into the reasons why we do not
treat withdrawals of ventilators, dialysis, or other treatments as
euthanasia. This takes us to another consideration.
IV. PERFECT VERSUS IMPERFECT REPLACEMENTS
From the distinction between withdrawing a ventilator and
disabling a transplanted heart, we can identify a second potential
basis for distinguishing between permissible withdrawal of
treatment and impermissible euthanasia. Transplanted hearts not
only replace the recipients’ own hearts, they seemingly constitute a
perfect replacement. A new heart is integrated into the recipient’s
body so that it functions in the same way as the recipient’s original
heart.
Why does this matter? A key reason for permitting patients to
refuse unwanted treatment lies in the fact that all medical

14. James C. Fang, Rise of the Machines—Left Ventricular Assist Devices as
Permanent Therapy for Advanced Heart Failure, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2282, 2282–83
(2009).
15. Noah, supra note 1, at 1234 (emphasis added).
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treatments come with risks as well as benefits.
Cancer
chemotherapy may eradicate tumor cells, but it also may kill
normal cells. No treatment is purely beneficial. Because a
treatment decision involves a weighing of benefits and detriments,
and different people may weigh the benefits and detriments
differently, we leave it up to the patient to make the decision. And
we leave it up to the patient even when the benefits are seemingly
great and the detriments seemingly minor. Patients may refuse
antibiotics for a life-threatening pneumonia or a blood transfusion
for a severe loss of blood, just as they may refuse chemotherapy for
16
metastatic cancer.
But if an implant were to serve as a perfect replacement for the
person’s original tissues or organ, there would not be any risks to
offset benefits. There would not be any drawbacks to the implant
17
that would make it less desirable than the original heart, and the
patient’s interest in having the implant deactivated would dissipate.
Hence, we might conclude that device deactivation constitutes
euthanasia only if the device replaces an essential cardiac function
and the device is a perfect replacement for the function. Both
18
conditions would have to be satisfied.
16. At one time, the law did take into account the burdensomeness of a lifesustaining treatment in deciding whether a patient had the right to refuse the
treatment. Earlier I mentioned the Quinlan court’s emphasis on the prognosis of
the patient—the more dismal the prognosis, the stronger the patient’s interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J.
1976). The Quinlan court also rested the right to refuse treatment on the nature
of the treatment—the more burdensome the treatment, the stronger the patient’s
interest in refusing it. Id. Just as the Quinlan standard has been superseded with
respect to the patient’s prognosis, it also has been superseded with respect to the
burdensomeness of the treatment. Patients may weigh for themselves the extent
to which a treatment’s burden should be taken into account. ORENTLICHER ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 248–49.
17. To be sure, there would have been risks involved with the surgery to
implant the cardiac device, but we are considering here the risks from leaving a
device inside the patient.
18. This alternative approach is similar to one that has been proposed by
Daniel Sulmasy and that Noah discusses. Daniel P. Sulmasy, Within You/Without
You: Biotechnology, Ontology, and Ethics, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. (Supp. 1) 69, 71–
72 (2008); Noah, supra note 1, at 1243–1248. There are some important
differences between Sulmasy’s approach and mine. First, he bases his approach
on the principle that deactivation of implanted therapies constitutes euthanasia
when an implant “participates in the organic unity of the patient” such that it “has
become ‘a part of the patient,’” Sulmasy, supra, at 71, rather than when the
implant poses no risks to the patient’s health. In addition, Sulmasy does not
require the implanted device to be a perfect replacement. The closer to
perfection, the more likely that deactivation would constitute euthanasia, but a
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Of course, even heart transplants come with some risks.
Patients must take drugs to suppress their bodies’ immune
response to a transplant so the transplant will not be “rejected.”
And these drugs have side effects, including putting the patient at
higher risk of cancer. Accordingly, even though a patient would
not be free to have the transplanted heart removed, the patient
would retain the right to stop taking immunosuppressive drugs.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not surprising that many scholars view the deactivation of
a cardiac implant differently than withdrawal of a treatment that
remains outside a person’s body. Cardiac devices can become
integrated into the recipient’s body in a way that makes them seem
more like an organ transplant than a ventilator or other artificial
treatment.
But consideration of ethics and law leads us to the principle
that what really matters is whether the device supplements or
replaces the patient’s own capacity and possibly whether the device
is an imperfect or perfect replacement. At a minimum, device
deactivation would constitute euthanasia only if the device replaced
the patient’s own capacity. It also might be necessary that the
device be a perfect replacement for the patient’s own capacity
before its deactivation should be considered euthanasia.

device apparently could fall somewhat short of being a perfect replacement and
still have its deactivation considered to be an act of euthanasia. Id. at 71–72.
Finally, it is not clear whether Sulmasy takes account of the extent to which the
device replaces rather than supplements the body’s own capacity.
That
consideration may be implicit in his analysis, id. at 72, but it is not an explicit
factor.
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